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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4707 
___________ 
 
ROBERT BENCHOFF, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MATTHEW FOGAL, District Attorney Franklin County;  
DOUGLAS HERMAN, P.J. Franklin County 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 1-13-cv-01216) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 7, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: August 13, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Robert Benchoff, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his 
civil rights action against President Judge Douglas Herman of the Franklin County Court 
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of Common Pleas and District Attorney Matthew Fogal.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 In 1995, Benchoff was sentenced in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 
on convictions for interference with custody of children and burglary.1  As part of his 
sentence, Benchoff was prohibited from contacting his wife and children without a court 
order allowing visitation.  On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated 
Benchoff’s sentence for burglary and he was resentenced in 1998.  The sentence also 
includes a no-contact provision.  The Superior Court affirmed the judgment, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 2001. 
 In 2004, Benchoff filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief 
Act (“PCRA”) challenging the no-contact provision of his sentence.  The trial court ruled, 
among other things, that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition because it was 
untimely.  The court also stated that Benchoff’s claim lacked arguable merit because the 
no-contact provision was within the sentencing court’s discretion.     
 More than five years later, in 2010, Benchoff filed a motion for extraordinary 
relief in state court seeking the removal of the no-contact provision from his sentence.  
Construing the filing as a post-sentence motion, the trial court ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction because the motion was untimely filed.  The trial court also concluded that  
                                              
1We have ascertained the relevant procedural history from the state court documents 
attached to Benchoff’s complaint. 
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Benchoff’s challenge to a discretionary aspect of his sentence was not cognizable under 
the PCRA, that the motion lacked merit because the facts surrounding the crime support 
the imposition of the no-contact order, and that Benchoff’s constitutional right of 
association was not violated.   
 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to modify Benchoff’s sentence, but found it more appropriate to treat the 
motion as a PCRA petition.  The Superior Court ruled that the petition was untimely 
under the PCRA.  The Superior Court rejected Benchoff’s arguments that the PCRA does 
not apply to him because it was enacted after he was sentenced, and that the statute’s 
retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court denied Benchoff’s petition for allowance of appeal.  Benchoff also unsuccessfully 
sought authorization from this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to file a second or 
successive habeas petition challenging the legality of his sentence.   
 Benchoff then filed his present complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in District 
Court against Judge Herman, who presided over both of Benchoff’s motions, and Fogal, 
who represents the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Benchoff re-framed his claims.  He 
no longer challenges the legality of the no-contact provision or seeks a modification of 
his sentence.  Instead, Benchoff challenges only his inability to have his motion heard in 
state court as a result of the application of the PCRA’s statute of limitations.  He seeks a 
declaration by the District Court that the state court has jurisdiction to entertain his 
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motion, or a declaration that the retroactive application of the PCRA’s statute of 
limitations to his motion violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
 Judge Herman and Fogal moved to dismiss the complaint on various grounds.  The 
Magistrate Judge concluded that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
Benchoff’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman2 doctrine.  In the alternative, the Magistrate 
Judge concluded that Judge Herman and Fogal are immune from liability, that Benchoff’s 
action is time-barred, and that Benchoff fails to state a claim for a violation of the Ex Post 
Facto Clause.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to 
grant the motions to dismiss Benchoff’s complaint.  This appeal followed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We first consider whether the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman.  Our standard of review is de 
novo.  Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, et al., 615 F.3d 159, 
163 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over 
suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.  Great Western, 615 F.3d at 
165.  Rooker-Feldman requires that “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the 
plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments’; (3) those 
judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting 
                                              
2District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.  
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
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the district court to review and reject the state judgments.”  Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). 
 These requirements are met to the extent Benchoff challenges the state court 
decisions that his motions are untimely under the PCRA.  Benchoff lost in state court 
when the state courts twice ruled that his PCRA motions were untimely.  Benchoff also 
complains of injuries caused by the state court orders.  He contends that his right to due 
process was violated “because the state did not evaluate [his] petitions seeking contact 
with his children against the law in place at the time of sentencing and in accordance with 
the rights established in the sentences, . . . .”  Compl. at 9.  He also claims violations of 
his rights to freedom of association and access to the courts because the application of the 
PCRA’s statute of limitations to his motions precludes him from serving his sentence as 
envisioned by the sentencing court.  Benchoff avers that the sentencing court intended 
that he would be able to seek to modify the no-contact provision any time before his 
sentence expired.   
 As recognized by the District Court, the state court rulings are the source of 
Benchoff’s alleged injuries.  He does not complain that a third party violated his rights.  
See Great Western, 615 F.3d at 166-67.  In addition, his alleged injuries did not exist 
prior to the state court proceedings.  Id. at 167.  Benchoff’s claims in this regard do not 
present an independent challenge to the constitutionality of the PCRA’s statute of 
limitations, but challenge the state court’s application of the statute to the facts of his 
case.  See Alvarez v Att’y Gen., 679 F.3d 1257, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding 
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Rooker-Feldman barred an as-applied due process claim).  The state court orders were 
issued before Benchoff filed his civil rights action, and he invites the District Court to 
review them in conjunction with his sentencing orders, and reject them by declaring, 
contrary to the state court, that the court has jurisdiction to entertain his motion.  We thus 
agree with the District Court that Rooker-Feldman bars these claims.  To the extent 
Benchoff claims that the PCRA’s statute of limitations violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, 
we find no error in the District Court’s ruling that Benchoff fails to state a claim for such 
a violation.3   
 Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.4 
                                              
3Based on these conclusions, it is unnecessary to address the District Court’s additional 
grounds for dismissal of the complaint. 
 
4Because Benchoff has narrowly framed the claims in his complaint to challenge the state 
court’s application of the PCRA’s statute of limitations to his motions, we have not 
considered what avenues of relief may be available to Benchoff to challenge the 
constitutionality of the no-contact order.  That question is not before us in this appeal. 
